Folio Gallimard 2006
"En fait, j'aurais tout aussi bien pu ne pas écrire. Après tout, ce
n'est pas une obligation. Depuis la guerre, je suis resté un homme
discret ; grâce à Dieu, je n'ai jamais eu besoin, comme certains de mes
anciens collègues, d'écrire mes Mémoires à fin de justification, car je
n'ai rien à justifier, ni dans un but lucratif, car je gagne assez bien
ma vie comme ça. Je ne regrette rien: j'ai fait mon travail, voilà tout;
quant à mes histoires de famille, que je raconterai peut-être aussi,
elles ne concernent que moi ; et pour le reste, vers la fin, j'ai sans
doute forcé la limite, mais là je n'étais plus tout à fait moi-même, je
vacillais, le monde entier basculait, je ne fus pas le seul à perdre la
tête, reconnaissez-le. Malgré mes travers, et ils ont été nombreux, je
suis resté de ceux qui pensent que les seules choses indispensables à la
vie humaine sont l'air, le manger, le boire et l'excrétion, et la
recherche de la vérité. Le reste est facultatif."
Je copie ici le commentaire d'une lectrice de Babelio, Gwen 21, posté en 2012 que je partage complètement.
Ecrire la critique des "Bienveillantes", voilà une tâche malaisée. Déjà,
impossible de le faire à chaud, il m'a fallu attendre quelques heures
afin de laisser retomber la pression.
L'oeuvre est monumentale, 1390
pages pour la collection Folio que j'ai attaquée (le terme est bien
choisi) en mars pour l'achever en juillet, soit 4 mois 1/2 ! Certes,
j'ai peu de temps pour lire et j'ai même mis le livre entre parenthèses
une semaine pour lire une oeuvre plus "légère" (ceux qui l'ont lu
comprendront la double signification de cet adjectif). C'était ma
deuxième tentative, j'avais déjà essayé de le lire en 2008 mais un
déménagement avait interrompu ma lecture, jamais reprise. Et puis, le
bouquin était sur ma bibliothèque et de par son épaisseur tranchait dans
le linéaire, semblant me narguer, me mettre au défi de... relever le
défi ! Car lire "les Bienveillantes" relève quasi du défi !
Je
mentirais si j'affirmais ne pas avoir été tentée à plusieurs reprises
de balancer cette brique à travers la pièce. Il faut comprendre (et vous
ne le comprenez vraiment qu'à partir du tiers de l'oeuvre) que deux
histoires s'acheminent de concert vers le dénouement : L Histoire (celle
de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale vue du côté des bourreaux) et l'histoire
du Dr Maximilien Aue, juriste enrôlé dans la SS, un homme au parcours
personnel complexe qui pour moi a clairement des allures de névrosé
psychopathe. Ses rapports à sa famille, à son enfance, à son entourage, à
ses partenaires sexuels... aucun ne me semble équilibré hormis son
rapport à son travail. Très professionnel, rigoureux jusqu'à
l'intransigeance, maniaque quoi, le genre de type qui bosse un peu
comme... moi ! Fort heureusement, le seul point commun entre mon travail
et le sien est de trouver des solutions à des problèmes de
fonctionnement interne pour accroître la productivité et fort
heureusement pour moi, la productivité qui me concerne n'a rien en
commun avec l'extermination d'une "race" humaine.
Pour être tout à
fait honnête, celle de ces deux histoires qui m'a le plus intéressée
n'est pas celle avec un petit "h" mais l'autre, la Grande, même s'il
m'est pénible de donner ce qualificatif à cette sombre période.
Pourtant, elle n'est pas si ancienne qu'elle soit déjà entrée dans
l'ombre, et trop traumatisante pour pouvoir être oubliée. Elle ne doit
pas être oubliée.
Mais je m'égare, revenons à l'oeuvre.
L'oeuvre est colossale. Rien qu'en termes de recherches, l'auteur mérite
qu'on lui tire notre chapeau. le style ensuite que j'ai trouvé parfois
pesant mais le plus souvent vif, tranchant, chirurgical, une écriture au
scalpel qui donne un rythme effréné salutaire car n'oublions pas qu'il y
a quand même près de 1400 pages donc mieux vaut un style affirmé qui
donne envie de tourner les pages !
Les points faibles de ce livre
sont, je l'avoue, tous pragmatiques : lourd (à déconseiller aux poignets
graciles et je ne recommande pas la lecture en position allongée),
écrit sur un papier tellement fin que vous avez l'impression de tenir
dans les mains votre stock d'OCB pour 10 ans, souvent impénétrable pour
qui, comme moi, n'a jamais étudié l'allemand (oui, je me suis vite
lassée d'avoir à me référer tous les deux paragraphes au glossaire en
fin de pavé pour comprendre les différentes abréviations (inévitables
quand il s'agit de nommer les services administratifs allemands!) et la
correspondance des grades entre la SS, les fonctionnaires et l'armée).
Sinon,
passés ces désagréments qui bien que réels ne doivent pas décourager le
lecteur, le fond ne peut laisser indifférent. J'ai été emportée, et
bien souvent malgré moi, dans une fascination glauque pour la narration
du Dr Aue, aimantée par les descriptions d'atrocités qui couvrent des
dizaines et des dizaines de pages, voulant à toute force comprendre,
percer le mystère, aller au fond de cette mentalité, comprendre comment,
par conviction politico-économique, par médiocrité, par pauvreté
matérielle et intellectuelle, par endoctrinement, par vice ou par
idéalisme, des millions d'hommes et de femmes en étaient arrivés là :
croire qu'en exterminant les "ennemis du peuple", en "rayant de la
carte" les "improductifs" et les Juifs, ils bâtiraient un monde
meilleur, idéal, idyllique, base d'un système politique garant de la
prospérité d'un peuple entier.
En refermant "les Bienveillantes"
(et j'ai été particulièrement heureuse, en lisant la scène finale,
d'être allée jusqu'au bout!), j'ai ressenti un trouble, une chute dans
le néant, un malaise et, l'espace de quelques instants, l'impression
d'avoir touché du doigt une vérité (l'une de celles qui composent L Histoire)
que je n'ai ressenti pour aucune oeuvre auparavant. le dénouement tant
attendu de ces deux histoires parallèles qui m'ont accompagnée dans ma
lecture pendant presque 5 mois a été comme un éblouissement de toute
l'oeuvre.
A lire dans son existence.
La prima volta l'ho letto 7 annifa, e mi aveva preso come una colla di quelle di adesso, che non te ne stacchi più. Mi era piaciuto molto, anche se anch'io ero più preso dalla storia con la H maiuscola che quella particolare e complessata del Dr. Aue e dell'amore per sua sorella.
A distanza di anni ho voluto chiudere le letture del 2015 riprendendo in mano lo stesso malloppo, che nel frattempo avevo prestato a qualcuno e ovviamente ho dovuto ricomprarlo. Le stesse sensazioni ed emozioni di prima. In un mese di tempo, rpofittando dei viaggi andata e ritorno in treno, e poi del tempo libero nel week-end, l'ho letto senza interruzioni. Concordo con Gwen, un libro da leggere nella propria vita. Ovviamente sarà nella Top dell'anno.
venerdì 11 dicembre 2015
lunedì 7 dicembre 2015
Va a finire che è colpa di Marine Le Pen
http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2015/12/07/news/regionali_in_francia_front_national_al_28_in_attesa_del_ballottaggio_di_domenica-128953772/?ref=HREC1-2
I francesi hanno
votato, dando quasi il 30% al primo turno al Fronte Nazionale. Letti un po’ di
articoli e sentiti alcuni commenti sulle televisioni francesi, sembra quasi che
sia arrivata la fine del mondo. Come se le politiche messe in atto da decenni
non avessero fatto di tutto per preparare il letto a questo partito, di chiare
origini xenofobe e che non ha mai potuto misurarsi con il difficile esercizio
del potere solo perché i due grandi blocchi, socialisti e destra gollista dall’altro,
non hanno mai voluto modificare il sistema elettorale francese imperniato su di
loro.
Adesso hanno
vinto, ma non è la prima volta che i segnali vengono mandati dal popolo
francese. Il problema è che i partiti al governo, prima Sarkozy e adesso
Hollande, hanno perso il contatto con la
realtà quotidiana di chi vive in Francia. Ma non sono solo loro, la storia va
molto più indietro. Chi avesse visto Les Guignols un po’ più di una ventina d’anni
fa, quando Primo Ministro socialista era il povero Pierre Bérégovoy, forse
ricorderà quella scenetta tra lui e il presentatore PPDA, che ragionavano sui
prezzi del latte ed altri prodotti di consumo quotidiano. Non avendo la minima
idea di cosa costassero nel paese che uno dirigeva e l’altro presentava ogni
sera al telegiornale principale, venivano derisi lanciando cifre astronomiche
sulle quali i due erano d’accordo. Facevano ridere, ma era un riso amaro, di
chi oramai viveva in un altro pianeta. E va bene per una star del giornalismo,
meno bene per un primo ministro socialista di chiare origini operai. Il povero
Bérégovoy si suicidò (1993) e il Presidente Mitterand disse che “era stato dato
in pasto ai cani”. Non faceva parte di quella casta politica che da decenni
comanda in Francia, ma ne era stato attratto e risucchiato dentro,
allontanandosi dalla vita vera, difficile e complicata, che gran parte dei
cittadini faceva e continua a fare.
Nel 2002 il
candidato socialista alle presidenziali venne eliminato al primo turno, uno shock
ancora peggiore di quello di ieri, soprattutto perché veniva dopo un periodo
come primo ministro dove tutto sembrava andare per il meglio (occhio, per chi
dettava le regole del nuovo capitalismo, non certo per la classe operaia che in
massa votò Le Pen padre).
Sono serviti
ancora 12 anni per arrivare alle Europee dell’anno scorso quando Marine Le Pen
prese il 25%. Ma nemmeno quel segnale venne colto. Adesso siamo oltre il 28% e
tutti a stupirsi e a proporre il Fronte Repubblicano.
Se i socialisti
avessero fatto i socialisti, di sinistra, e non trasformandosi in sinistri
elementi rincorrendo la destra di Sarkozy che a sua volta rincorre il FN, forse
non saremmo arrivati qui. Ma pensare che tutto si risolva facendo fronte contro
il Fronte, è un’altra sciocchezza. Servivano politiche diverse, bisognava fare
in modo che il film L’Odio (La haine) il film di Mathieu
Kassovitz con Vincent Cassel come protagonista, del 1995, diventasse roba
vecchia. E invece le periferie di oggi sono ancora così com’erano, se non
peggio come direbbe mia figlia che le sta frequentando per i suoi studi.
Non
si è fatto nulla, solo investire sui militari, i Rafale, più tasse, meno presenza
dello Stato, una politica estera senza una visione che andasse al di là degli
interessi francesi, per cui sempre a difendere le caste al potere nei paesi
clienti, fino all’avventura suicida di Sarkozy in Libia, col casino attuale che
non si sa come risolvere e adesso, ciliegina sulla torta, i bombardamenti in
Siria che, nella visione di Hollande, dovrebbero eliminare l’ISIS. Continuate
con queste politiche e Marine sarà Presidente fra un anno e mezzo.
martedì 1 dicembre 2015
The human rights crisis: a problem of perception?
interesting document to be shared...
www.opendemocracy.net /openglobalrights/nicola-perugini-neve-gordon/human-rights-crisis-problemof-perception
Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini
When Israel is criticized about its rights-abusive policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the refrain most often heard among local politicians is that the government’s hasbara—the Israeli propaganda machine—is inadequate. The problem, in other words, is not what Israel actually does to the Palestinians, but rather the inability to get its positive message across to the international community. This is usually referred to as “rebranding Israel”. The underlying assumption here is that the merchandise is fine, and only the packaging needs to be replaced.
Rachel Krys’ recent argument is based on a similar logic, even though she is writing about a different
issue. She tells us that most people in the UK do not support human rights, while arguing that this is
happening because human rights are presented in a way that is disconnected from people’s everyday
lives. She claims that if the public would hear less “negative discourse” about human rights and more
“stories about old people challenging bad treatment, invasive decisions or the intrusion into their private and family life”, support for human rights would be much wider. Once again the problem with human rights has to do with perceptions, and the solution, here as well, is hasbara.
The relationship between representation and reality is, however, much more complex. It has to do with human rights themselves: the way they have been institutionalized, the political projects to which they lend themselves, their intricate connections to the state, and the alternative discourses of justice they omit and repress.
Human rights can, and often do, enhance domination. We do not assume, as many human rights
practitioners and scholars do, that more human rights necessarily lead to more emancipation. Indeed, the assumption that people would believe in human rights if only they better understood human rights work is misguided. Human rights can, and often do, enhance domination. This issue becomes particularly urgent when NGOs that purport to criticize abuse align themselves with the very powers they investigate and criticize.
Consider a 2013 report on drone attacks in which Human Rights Watch (HRW) examines six unacknowledged US military attacks against alleged Al-Qaeda members in Yemen. Eighty-two people, of whom at least 57 civilians, were killed in these attacks. Yet this is a mere sample of the 81 attacks carried out in Yemen, and it does not include the hundreds of targeted killings in Pakistan and Somalia.HRW argues that two of the six attacks were in clear violation of international humanitarian law because they only struck civilians, or they used indiscriminate weapons. HRW also states that:
"The other four cases may have violated the laws of war because the individual attacked was not a lawful military target or the attack caused disproportionate civilian harm, determinations that require further investigation. In several of these cases the US military also did not take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians, as the laws of war require."
The underlying logic of these statements is subtle, but very disturbing since it exposes how adherence to international law can advance domination. For HRW it is unclear whether the remaining four cases
violated the law. But, if it turns out that the military had used discriminate weapons, taken all the
“necessary precautions”, and finally killed civilians while targeting militants, then the "deliberate killing by a government" in another country halfway across the globe does not in fact constitute a violation. Phrases like “all necessary precautions” are exactly where human rights advocates begin aligning themselves with military power.
Following the dictates of international humanitarian law, HRW goes on to discuss whether the "terrorist suspects" are in fact "valid military targets", whether the situation in Yemen can be characterized as passing the "threshold of armed conflict" as well as whether the assassinations adhere to US policies of targeted killing. And, although it acknowledges the lawfulness of some of the attacks, it criticizes the US government for not offering compensation to families whose members were killed as civilian bystanders.
Hence, as this report demonstrates, when human rights are subservient to international legal discourse, the best they can do is to call for a reduction of civilian casualties, the provision of economic compensation for victims, and guarantees that future targeted killings comply with the law.
Indeed, such reports underscore what happens to human rights once they have been hijacked by the law and become a prism for debating the legality or illegality of violence—namely, they cease to raise questions about the morality and legitimacy of the law itself. This becomes even more striking when reading the HRW report not only for what it says, but also for what it fails to say. For example, the report cites Faisal Bin Ali Jaber, a relative of a cleric and policeman wrongfully killed during a drone attack, as saying: “We are caught between a drone on one side and Al-Qaeda on the other.” And, yet, HRW fails to acknowledge that for Ali Jaber the drone attacks are tantamount to Al Qaeda's acts of terrorism. This oversight is also a consequence of the reduction of human rights to the formal dictates of international law, an approach that HRW has doggedly adopted.
Regardless of the thousands of civilians killed during the drone wars, and the terrorizing effect these wars have had on entire populations, insofar as drones are armed with discriminate weapons and do not intend to kill civilians, the US drone wars are not —in HRW's view—a terrorist act. In this way, the law permitting the dominant to kill is preserved and even reinforced by those who struggle for human rights. It is precisely when human rights denunciations are articulated in a way that complies with the sovereign's right to kill that human rights become a discourse that rationalizes killing—what we call, counter-intuitively, “the human right to kill”.
Finally, it is crucial to ask whether the HRW's drone report really represents the population in Yemen. Put differently, the problem of representation does not only or primarily have to do with how human rights are portrayed in the media, but rather involves the fact that human rights NGOs operate as if they had a natural mandate from the wretched of the earth. In reality, however, human rights NGOs prevent human rights from becoming a popular language deployed by the people for their own—popular—mobilization. In this sense, human rights can never become a tool of the masses, but only of those experts who claim to represent the wronged population.
The crisis of human rights, in other words, is not really one of perceptions. It is about complicity with
domination
www.opendemocracy.net /openglobalrights/nicola-perugini-neve-gordon/human-rights-crisis-problemof-perception
Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini
When Israel is criticized about its rights-abusive policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the refrain most often heard among local politicians is that the government’s hasbara—the Israeli propaganda machine—is inadequate. The problem, in other words, is not what Israel actually does to the Palestinians, but rather the inability to get its positive message across to the international community. This is usually referred to as “rebranding Israel”. The underlying assumption here is that the merchandise is fine, and only the packaging needs to be replaced.
Rachel Krys’ recent argument is based on a similar logic, even though she is writing about a different
issue. She tells us that most people in the UK do not support human rights, while arguing that this is
happening because human rights are presented in a way that is disconnected from people’s everyday
lives. She claims that if the public would hear less “negative discourse” about human rights and more
“stories about old people challenging bad treatment, invasive decisions or the intrusion into their private and family life”, support for human rights would be much wider. Once again the problem with human rights has to do with perceptions, and the solution, here as well, is hasbara.
The relationship between representation and reality is, however, much more complex. It has to do with human rights themselves: the way they have been institutionalized, the political projects to which they lend themselves, their intricate connections to the state, and the alternative discourses of justice they omit and repress.
Human rights can, and often do, enhance domination. We do not assume, as many human rights
practitioners and scholars do, that more human rights necessarily lead to more emancipation. Indeed, the assumption that people would believe in human rights if only they better understood human rights work is misguided. Human rights can, and often do, enhance domination. This issue becomes particularly urgent when NGOs that purport to criticize abuse align themselves with the very powers they investigate and criticize.
Consider a 2013 report on drone attacks in which Human Rights Watch (HRW) examines six unacknowledged US military attacks against alleged Al-Qaeda members in Yemen. Eighty-two people, of whom at least 57 civilians, were killed in these attacks. Yet this is a mere sample of the 81 attacks carried out in Yemen, and it does not include the hundreds of targeted killings in Pakistan and Somalia.HRW argues that two of the six attacks were in clear violation of international humanitarian law because they only struck civilians, or they used indiscriminate weapons. HRW also states that:
"The other four cases may have violated the laws of war because the individual attacked was not a lawful military target or the attack caused disproportionate civilian harm, determinations that require further investigation. In several of these cases the US military also did not take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians, as the laws of war require."
The underlying logic of these statements is subtle, but very disturbing since it exposes how adherence to international law can advance domination. For HRW it is unclear whether the remaining four cases
violated the law. But, if it turns out that the military had used discriminate weapons, taken all the
“necessary precautions”, and finally killed civilians while targeting militants, then the "deliberate killing by a government" in another country halfway across the globe does not in fact constitute a violation. Phrases like “all necessary precautions” are exactly where human rights advocates begin aligning themselves with military power.
Following the dictates of international humanitarian law, HRW goes on to discuss whether the "terrorist suspects" are in fact "valid military targets", whether the situation in Yemen can be characterized as passing the "threshold of armed conflict" as well as whether the assassinations adhere to US policies of targeted killing. And, although it acknowledges the lawfulness of some of the attacks, it criticizes the US government for not offering compensation to families whose members were killed as civilian bystanders.
Hence, as this report demonstrates, when human rights are subservient to international legal discourse, the best they can do is to call for a reduction of civilian casualties, the provision of economic compensation for victims, and guarantees that future targeted killings comply with the law.
Indeed, such reports underscore what happens to human rights once they have been hijacked by the law and become a prism for debating the legality or illegality of violence—namely, they cease to raise questions about the morality and legitimacy of the law itself. This becomes even more striking when reading the HRW report not only for what it says, but also for what it fails to say. For example, the report cites Faisal Bin Ali Jaber, a relative of a cleric and policeman wrongfully killed during a drone attack, as saying: “We are caught between a drone on one side and Al-Qaeda on the other.” And, yet, HRW fails to acknowledge that for Ali Jaber the drone attacks are tantamount to Al Qaeda's acts of terrorism. This oversight is also a consequence of the reduction of human rights to the formal dictates of international law, an approach that HRW has doggedly adopted.
Regardless of the thousands of civilians killed during the drone wars, and the terrorizing effect these wars have had on entire populations, insofar as drones are armed with discriminate weapons and do not intend to kill civilians, the US drone wars are not —in HRW's view—a terrorist act. In this way, the law permitting the dominant to kill is preserved and even reinforced by those who struggle for human rights. It is precisely when human rights denunciations are articulated in a way that complies with the sovereign's right to kill that human rights become a discourse that rationalizes killing—what we call, counter-intuitively, “the human right to kill”.
Finally, it is crucial to ask whether the HRW's drone report really represents the population in Yemen. Put differently, the problem of representation does not only or primarily have to do with how human rights are portrayed in the media, but rather involves the fact that human rights NGOs operate as if they had a natural mandate from the wretched of the earth. In reality, however, human rights NGOs prevent human rights from becoming a popular language deployed by the people for their own—popular—mobilization. In this sense, human rights can never become a tool of the masses, but only of those experts who claim to represent the wronged population.
The crisis of human rights, in other words, is not really one of perceptions. It is about complicity with
domination
COP 21: Qui lo dico e qui lo nego
Perché dopo non
ci siano i soliti balletti di dichiarazioni di tutti i tipi sui risultati che
si saranno raggiunti alla fine di questa COP, ricordiamo qui i tre punti
principali che determineranno se si sarà trattato di un successo o, come io
credo, di un insuccesso.
Il sito del governo francese cosí li riassume
1. Firmare un accordo “contraignant” (vedi
sito del governo francese), cioè vincolante per le parti
2. Mantenere il riscaldamento climatico sotto
i 2° da qui al 2100 (occhio che siamo già arrivati a 0.85°)
3. Mettere sul tavolo 100 miliardi di dollari
l’anno a partire dal 2020.
Questi sono gli
obbiettivi. Hic Rhodus, hic salta, tocca a voi Capi di Stato e Primi ministri dimostrarci
il vostro valore.
Para evitar que
después nos digan cualquier cosa, con declaraciones de todo tipo sobre los
resultados logrados al final de esta ronda de COP, creo útil recordar los tres
puntos principales que determinarán si habrá sido un éxito o, como yo creo, un
fracaso.
El sito del
gobierno francés así los indica:
1. Lograr un acuerdo vinculante para las
partes
2. Mantener el calentamiento climático debajo
de los 2° de aquí al 2100 (ojo que ya estamos a 0.85°)
3. Meter sobre la mesa 100 billones de dólares
por año a partir del 2020.
Estos son los
objetivos. Hic Rhodus, hic salta, le toca a Uds. Jefes de Estado y Primeros ministros de demonstrar su valor.
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